SSHRC Program of Study

Mythical Creatures and Divine Entities

The belief in divine beings and mythical creatures is a universal phenomenon which has been attested to in every culture and time period. The conviction of the existence of gods, demigods, spirits, and angels has long affected the way people think, act, and perceive the world; hence, the proper interpretation of various cultural groups’ beliefs in these beings and creatures demands the attention of the scholarly community. My particular interest is in the role that legendary creatures function as symbols within religious communities. Authors of religious texts often make substantial use of legendary creatures as religious symbols, and their usage of these creatures may either reflect their assent or disagreement with the cultural normative beliefs that their audiences have about these creatures. Thus, the mythological beliefs of a given religious group need to be examined in order to better understand the religious claims made by these sorts of texts. More specifically, legendary creatures are discussed in the Hebrew Bible, Second Temple Jewish literature, and the New Testament. It follows then that the careful study of the various uses and significance of these sacred (or profane) creatures plays an invaluable role for enabling religious scholars to better understand these ancient texts and other texts of similar nature.

The Embodiment of Chaos in Ancient Israelite Religious Thought

In particular, my interests lie in the role that mythical creatures play in ancient Israelite religion. A number of references are made to various mythical creatures in the Hebrew Bible, including the Nephilim, the Seraphim, Azazel, Behemoth, Rahab, and Leviathan, etc. In particular, extensive scholarship concerning Rahab and Leviathan has demonstrated that ancient Israelites understood these figures to be mythical dragons embodying (or representing) chaos. Thus, references to these monsters in the biblical (and extra-biblical) texts would, presumably, invoke ancient Israelite familiarity with traditions regarding them. Some examples of these texts include: the apocalyptic image of the monster Leviathan in Isaiah 27:1 which maintains that God will have a final and permanent victorious confrontation with the chaotic dragon Leviathan (66-68); the notion in Psalms 74:12-17, 89:10-15 that God defeated a chaos monster (God’s Conflict 18-28); the Book of Job which uses pre-creation imagery to represent God’s primordial battle with chaos in 3:10 (Bergant 38-39) and Job 40:15-34 which depicts Leviathan and Behemoth as being subdued by God (God’s Conflict 86-87); and Daniel 7’s apocalyptic visions which invokes imagery of four beasts emerging from the sea which is, according to Longman and Reid, symbolically used to represent the cosmic dimension of the struggle between Israel and its enemies (63-69). Clearly, each of these books presumes a prior familiarity with this tradition of a dragon(s) embodying chaos.

Further research must be undertaken in order to deepen our understanding of the role that these monsters (Rahab and Leviathan) and other legendary creatures play in the biblical authors’ theologies and, thus, advance our understanding of the particular texts in question. Authors, such as H. Gunkel and, more recently, John Day, have only begun to demonstrate the benefits of thorough research into the background of these legendary creatures; namely, this research begins to open up a new dimension to the religious texts in question, and further demonstrates the effects of intercultural communication upon ancient Israel. Regarding the ladder, John Day, for example, argues that the figure Leviathan is borrowed from earlier Canaanite mythology, traces of which can be found in the Ugaritic texts (“Leviathan” 295). Furthermore, Lang sees the motif of a divine warrior overcoming chaos in Akkadian mythology (57-62). Others, including Newsom and Schreiner, uphold the importance of both the Ugaritic and Akkadian texts to mark the more generally widespread acceptance of this motif throughout the Ancient Near East (594).

The Question which Inspires me to Study at the Graduate Level

Biblical scholars must consider the following: “What sort of creatures and beings do the biblical (and extra-biblical) authors presume exist when they make use of the symbol of (a) chaos monster(s) or other legendary creatures in religious teachings or messages?” Answering this question will allow biblical scholars to better understand these texts, their cultural backgrounds, and how they may be understood and interpreted by the contemporary religious communities who uphold these texts as sacred scripture today. In particular, these texts are important for many present-day religious groups due to their high regard of the Hebrew Bible as a scriptural authority, source for self-understanding, and personal meaning. Furthermore, this task of accurately comprehending these religious authors’ beliefs in legendary creatures is particularly important in a multicultural society which promotes the growth and flourishing of the rich traditions of all religious communities. Hence, it is the aforementioned question and its continuing relevance for the modern world that draws my attention to academia. Thus, I wish to continue studying at the graduate level in order to better understand and address this question.

How I Will Pursue a Response to This Question

Currently, I am a graduate student at the University of Toronto pursuing a Master of Arts degree in Religion. The University of Toronto is an excellent place for me to pursue this question for several reasons. At this institution, I not only have access to the resources offered by the Department and Centre for the Study of Religion, but I also have access to the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Studies, and the Toronto School of Theology. Each of these departments have faculty that specialize in Ancient Israelite and Jewish religion. Moreover, there is a plethora of library materials concerning this subject readily available and easily accessible. Furthermore, the university offers a very wide range of languages, and I am able to enhance my studies in both primary languages (Biblical Hebrew, Koine Greek, etc.) and also in modern languages (French, German, etc.).
In addition, there are many ancient Israelite religion courses offered at the University of Toronto, so I am able to focus all of my coursework in this specific area. Thus, I can continue to thoroughly research my interests throughout the duration of each of my courses and continually develop my scholarship skills through the guidance of key figures in the field of ancient Israelite religion such as Dr. Hindy Najman, Dr. Judith Newman, and Dr. Sarianna Metso. Furthermore, my supervisor – Dr. Glen Taylor – who has done research and published works overlapping with my own interests (the existence of sun worship in ancient Israel) will be able to help direct me towards the most effective resources for pursuing my research interests.
Works Cited

Bergant, Dianne. Job, Ecclesiastes. Eds. Carroll Stuhlmueller, and Martin McNamara. Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1982.

Day, John. God’s conflict with the dragon and the sea: Echoes of a Canaanite myth in the Old Testament. Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Day, John. “Leviathan.” The Anchor Bible Dictionary. vol. 4. Ed. David Noel Freedman. New York: Doubleday, 1st edition 1992. 295.
Lang, Bernhard. The Hebrew God: Portrait of an Ancient Deity. London, Great Britain: Yale University Press, 2002.

Longman III, Tremper, and Daniel G. Reid. God is a Warrior. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1995.

Newsom, C.A., and S.E. Schreiner. “Book of Job.” Dictionary of Biblical Interpretation. vol. 1. Ed. John H. Hayes. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1st edition 1999. 587-599.

Niditch, Susan. Ancient Israelite Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Expansion of the Religious into the Secular: Understanding what the Contemporary World Means by the Term “Religion”

Throughout Smith, van Voorst, and Masuzawa’s works, the theme of how the west, particularly Christians, have categorized the world’s religious traditions is blatant. In particular, both Smith and Masuzawa demonstrate how historically the pursuit of categorizing “world religions” has typically been a Christian endeavor. Moreover, it was not until relatively modern times (the twenties and thirties) that the term “world religions” was used in the way that it is used contemporarily (Masuzawa 37). I found these particular readings highly thought-provoking and also rather disconcerting. This was particularly the case when several key concerns came to mind while reading these pieces; specifically, “what is a world religion?” I contend that our contemporary understanding is rather fluid, which, therefore, complicates scholarly religious studies discussion.

In earlier days, if someone had asked me what ‘religion’ was, I would have said something along the lines of “a belief in God” and listed off Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (the only three traditions I would have known by name at the time) as examples. Clearly, my personal categorization of religion at this time would have been fairly similar to the pre-nineteenth century notion of the three “Abrahamic religions” and “other” or “idolatry” (Smith 276). Of course, my understanding of what to include in my list of “world religions” has expanded since I was in elementary school and now includes Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Jainism, and all of the other religious traditions that are typically discussed in a post-secondary religious studies setting.

However, you will note that several of these other religious traditions (such as the Vaisnavas) do not fit my earlier definition of religion (a belief in God). Hence, over time, I also revised my definition of religion. My revised definition of religion came to be “a belief in (a) higher-power(s)”. Yet this definition still seemed to fall short of encompassing several “religious” traditions; thus, I made a further amendment to my understanding and came to define religion as “a system of beliefs in something beyond the perceptible in this world”. However, consider an atheist who still attends synagogue, for cultural or traditional purposes. Might a devoted (yet atheistic) member of a synagogue (or church, etc) still be considered “religious”? To further complicate this, imagine that this same person also partook in his or her religious community’s rituals, partook in their festivals, upheld their ethical codes, and that the only thing separating that person from being a stereotypical member of their religious community was their absence of faith or belief in their tradition. Certainly, from an outsider’s perspective, without actually dialoguing with the person or their community, one would assume that this person was “religious”. Moreover, in terms of the Jewish community, most practicing Jews would still consider a fellow Jew, though perhaps a staunch atheist, a Jew and an inheritor of Abraham’s covenant.

Thus, belief does not, necessarily, seem to be the defining aspect of religion, which was often thought to be the case in the seventeenth century; rather, this understanding of what constitutes religion seems to be rooted in the Protestant Reformation traditions (Smith 271). There appears to be some form of ritualistic, ethical, and, possibly, a communal component to what we would, contemporarily, classify as “religion”. My concern in this blog is not simply to trace my understanding of “religion” and to appropriate it with the evolving European understanding of religion. However, I wanted to point out that my own personal understanding of the numerous and diverse traditions that I have now appropriated under the term “religion” has been, largely, dictated by what other people have told me fit into that category. Furthermore, this understanding of the traditions that fall under the rubric “religion” have come from the Religious Studies discipline, and the religious traditions that have commonly come to be discussed in these settings have come to be recognized as religious traditions due to the process of European “categorization” that Smith and Masuzawa discuss.

Since my earlier definitions of “religion” have all come to be amended to encompass the various religious traditions I have encountered, I can’t help but wonder what my definition of “religion” would have been at this point had I not been studying religious traditions in an academic setting for the past four years. Thus when a pair of people discuss “religion” with one another, are they even talking about the same thing? This especially becomes the case if they come from divergent religious backgrounds themselves. How about scholars? Do we as religious scholars even discuss the same thing when we talk about religion? My suspicion is that we often do not. Of course, this sort of thinking can be taken further when we apply this to particular religious traditions. For example, if one were to approach a Hindu man and ask him if he is a “Hindu”, he is likely explain that, in fact, the term Hindu is a European label for a wide variety of Indian religious traditions and then proceed to explain that he is a Vaisnava or a Shaivite, etc.

Masuzawa explains that was not until the nineteenth century that authors began to move away from looking at different traditions religions rather than sects or denominations in some sort of relation with a particular author’s brand of Christianity (58; cf. Van Voorst 15). Hence, one must wonder how the western understanding of the broad, and rather ambiguous, term “religion” will continue to evolve in the years to come, especially one when considers that even today the study of religion is still heavily influenced by outside concerns, although, today’s influences are the economic concerns of the institution (Masuzawa 9). Will we continue to hold onto our rigid categorical approach to the various anthropological traditions of the world? Can we even presume to be discussing the same concept with one another when we speak about “religion” since the term itself appears to be used so fluidly?
Andrew

Importing the Contemporary World into Religious Writings: Hermeneutical Problems in Interpreting Religious Texts

When studying religious traditions from a critical point of view, there are inevitably several problems that will arise. In particular, the proper interpretation of religious texts is an especially difficult and demanding task, for each interpreter that attempts to analyze these texts will bring personal preconceptions to the writings. Thus, a key concern for anyone who seeks to earnestly understand religious texts from a clinical point of view, is how one is to prevent one’s personal background from influencing one’s reading of the texts, and, furthermore, what sort of methodology might one adopt in order to approach the texts from a point of view that preserves the intrinsic integrity of such texts. These are some important considerations that both Bynum and Huntington address in their papers.

Inevitably when reading a religious text, one is disposed to impose one’s own personal life-experiences into the text. Hence, any two people who read a religious text might have significant differences in opinion in regards to the writing’s proper interpretation. For example, a fourteenth century Catholic priest would likely interpret the creation accounts of Genesis 1-2 quite differently from a twenty-first century religious studies student. Similarly, a contemporary Evangelical Protestant’s reading of the Epistle of James would likely differ from a Roman Catholic reading of the same epistle (especially with regards to 2:14-26 on faith and works). Hence, there are considerable disagreements which arise over the interpretation of religious texts from one person to another, and such predispositions are difficult to overcome. Thus, many interpreters will employ various methods in order to separate themselves from personal bias and to better understand the texts’ meaning.

However, methodologies themselves are problematic, which Bynum and Huntington both acknowledge. For example, many modern critical methodologies are largely twenty and twenty-first century western constructions presuming to properly understand people(s) from different eras and cultures. Bynum notes that modern scholarship often emphasizes sex and money, which “may tell us more about the twentieth century than the late Middle Ages” (“Introduction” 1). This is clear, Bynum explains, since the medieval thinkers were far more concerned with gluttony and hunger, which had to do with the preparation of the reception of the Eucharist (2-4).

Similarly, Huntington picks up this issue explaining that there are many interpretive difficulties in understanding the Mādhyamika literature due to its recent introduction to the west (“Methodological Considerations” 9). In particular, Huntington remarks that there are many interpretive problems for western scholars who read a literary tradition that is so foreign to them. Huntington maintains that it is essential to understand the background and context of the text in order to understand the piece itself (9). Similarly, Bynum emphasizes the importance of this as well, stating “women’s behavior and women’s writing must be understood in the context of social, economic, and ecclesiastical structures, theological and devotional traditions, very different from our own” (“Introduction” 9).

Hence, both Bynum and Huntington address the issue of coming to a richer understanding of the background of a text. Accordingly, Bynum attempts to separate herself from any potential personal spiritual concerns that she may bring to the texts and states that her research is not concerned with whether the miracles she considers are “true”. Rather, she is concerned about the stories that interested the medieval audience (8). However, this separation of the verifiability of miracles from the interests of the audience of the era is also problematic. Huntington draws attention to this problem; in particular, Huntington makes a comparison between the text-critical method (which he maintains is unconcerned with questions about meaning) and the alternative “proselytic” model (“Methodological Considerations” 6). Furthermore, he points out that “strict adherence to the text-critical and proselytic models constitutes a violation of the very texts we bring to our study” (8). Accordingly, Huntington’s methodological approach includes principles of “text-critical scholarship while simultaneously rejecting the largely unstated presuppositions of “objectivity” that normally accompany them” (12-13). Hence, Huntington asserts his position that the objective position is not necessarily the most fruitful method for approaching a religious text. Bynum also remarks on the futility of taking a single approach and states that historians could gain a lot by making use of “anthropology, sociology and art history” (“In Praise of Fragments: History in the Comic Mode”15 ).

Thus, Bynum and Huntington both demonstrate some of the issues involved in textual interpretation. They shed light on the problems of bringing personal predispositions to texts, the problems of a strictly “objective” approach to the text, and the problems of approaching a text with a single method. Moreover, they emphasize the importance for understanding the world behind the text for the proper interpretation of the text (especially in a contemporary western setting). In summation, I believe that the problems described in these essays demonstrates the importance of a collaborative approach to studying religious texts, because personal prejudices and seemingly all methodological approaches to religious texts have their limitations which may only begin to be rectified by the synthesizing of ideas.